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Introduction
There is a signiﬁcant body of literature comparing real estate investment trust (REIT)
performance to that of other common stocks. However, studies examining REIT returns
disagree as to whether REITs behave like other common stocks. Chan, Hendershott and
Saunders (1990) and Han (1990) ﬁnd that REIT performance is comparable to the
performance of the stock market in general, while Howe and Shilling (1990) and Martin
and Cook (1991) ﬁnd REITs underperform the general stock market. Wang, Chan and
Gau (1992) studied REIT initial public offerings (IPOs) and ﬁnd signiﬁcant overpricing
for REITs underwritten by less prestigious ﬁrms and no overpricing for REITs
underwritten by prestigious ﬁrms. Below, Zaman and McIntosh (1995) ﬁnd investors are
not better off waiting to purchase REITs in the aftermarket, rather than on the IPO, and
conclude that REIT IPOs are therefore correctly priced. The results of these studies
documenting the underperformance of REITs are troubling in an efﬁcient markets
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Abstract. A signiﬁcant body of research exists documenting that REITs perform differently
from other types of equity securities, although the reasons for these differences are unclear.
This study examines the intraday trading behavior of Real Estate Investment Trusts
(REITs). Speciﬁcally, intraday REIT returns, volume, trading activity, and bid/ask spread
are examined in an attempt to better understand the patterns of intraday information ﬂow
for a sample of REITs trading on the NYSE. After controlling for differences in market
capitalization, share price and institutional holdings, this paper analyzes differences
between REITs and non-REITs, and between REITs that are widely held by institutions
and those that are not. The results suggest that, as a group, REITs exhibit lower average
volumes and number of trades than do similar non-REITs. In addition, the ﬁndings suggest
that mortgage REITs trade at spreads that are smaller than those of similar non-REITs,
while equity REITs trade at spreads that are wider. Surprisingly, the analysis of
institutional ownership suggests that equity REITs that are widely held by institutions
exhibit the largest divergence from non-REITs in terms of both intraday trading activity
and volume, but at the same time trade closer to non-REITs in terms of bid/ask spread.
Overall, the results of this study conﬁrm that REITs are treated differently by investors
than similar non-REITs, and the institutional ownership ﬁndings suggest that trading
activity is less important as a determinant of REIT performance than is the level of
institutional ownership.context, while the studies that ﬁnd REIT IPOs to be either overpriced or correctly priced
are in marked contrast to the large volume of literature documenting signiﬁcant
underpricing for equity IPOs in general.
Wang, Erickson, Gau, and Chan (1994), hereafter WEGC, examine the underperfor-
mance/overpricing dilemma of REITs with respect to whether a security is widely
followed by analysts, or whether it is widely held by institutional investors. They ﬁnd
REITs that are either widely held by institutional investors or widely followed by analysts
perform better than REITs that are not widely held or widely followed by analysts. They
argue that this indicates that the market microstructure of REITs is at least partially to
blame for making them ‘‘different’’ from other equity securities.
WEGC go on to present two possible explanations for their ﬁndings. The ﬁrst is based
on Brennan’s (1990) latent assets arguments and attributes the underperformance of
thinly followed REITs to the high cost of information gathering on the part of small
investors in such REITs. They argue that if only a few informed investors are actively
involved in trading a security, the price of the security will not adjust to reﬂect changes in
the actual value of the REIT’s underlying assets.
The second explanation involves possible agency costs related to how REIT shares are
sold at the IPO. They argue that if a REIT IPO is aggressively sold to uninformed
investors, the price of the REIT will ultimately decline in the future as information about
the actual value of the underlying assets is revealed to the market. While both explanations
appear plausible, WEGC are unable to determine which is responsible for their ﬁnding
that REIT stock returns are highly correlated with market microstructure. The purpose of
this study is to examine the latent assets argument in detail, using a transaction-by-
transaction NYSE database. If a lack of information is driving the observed under-
performance of REITs, there should be observable differences between the intraday
trading patterns of REITs as opposed to non-REITs, as well as observable differences in
the trading patterns of REITs with respect to levels of institutional ownership.
Using transactions data obtained from the Institute for the Study of Security Markets
(ISSM), this study investigates whether REITs exhibit trading patterns similar to those of
non-REIT securities. Speciﬁcally, the following questions are addressed:
• Are REIT intraday return patterns structurally different than non-REIT
intraday stock return patterns?
• Are REIT intraday volume (number of shares traded) and trading activity
(number of transactions) patterns structurally different than those of non-
REIT stocks?
• Are REIT intraday bid/ask spread patterns structurally different than those
of non-REIT stocks?
• Does institutional ownership impact the intraday trading patterns of REITs
differently than it does non-REIT stocks?
Over the past few years, researchers have utilized intraday transactions and quotations
data to investigate intraday bid/ask spreads, return variability and trading volume, as well
as intraday market adjustments to newly disclosed information. The patterns uncovered
by these researchers have forced ﬁnancial economists to rethink many previously held
beliefs concerning these issues. This study undertakes a similar line of research for a
sample of NYSE-traded REITs, thereby providing an opportunity to compare the
trading patterns of REITs with those of other publicly traded equity securities. If
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signiﬁcant differences in intraday trading patterns between REITs and non-REITs
should not exist. However, if REIT investors ﬁnd it more costly to obtain essential
information for REITs than for non-REITs, as the latent assets hypothesis suggests,
analysis of the intraday trading patterns should reveal lower levels of information trading
occurring in REITs versus non-REITS.
Literature Review
Wood, McInish and Ord (1985) use NYSE transactions data to investigate intraday
returns and return variance patterns over two periods: 1971–72 and 1982. They
document U-shaped patterns for both intraday returns and intraday return variance. By
examining the plot of returns using minute-by-minute trading quotes, they ﬁnd positive
average returns for the ﬁrst thirty trading minutes, inconsequential average returns
throughout the trading day, and positive average returns again just prior to the close.
They also document unusually high standard deviations at the beginning and end of the
trading day. These results imply that intraday returns and return variance are not
randomly distributed, and they also suggest that overnight information is being
disseminated into the market within the ﬁrst thirty minutes of trading.
Jain and Joh (1988) examine hourly trading volume on the NYSE and hourly returns
for the S&P 500 between 1979 and 1983. They show that the average trading volumes
across six trading hours of the day differ signiﬁcantly. They documented a U-shaped
pattern where average volume is highest during the ﬁrst hour, declines monotonically
until the fourth hour, and then increases again through the ﬁfth and six hours of trading.
Jain and Joh also ﬁnd that common stock returns differ across trading hours of the day.
On average, they ﬁnd that the largest stock returns occur during the ﬁrst and last trading
hours, with the lowest average returns occurring during the ﬁfth hour of the trading day.
These results generally conﬁrm the earlier work by Wood, McInish and Ord (1985) and
again show that overnight information is being disseminated within the ﬁrst hour of the
trading day. Since the latent assets hypothesis argues that REITs have fewer informed
traders than other types of equity securities, the expectation would be to ﬁnd signiﬁcantly
lower volume and number of trades for REITs throughout the day as compared to non-
REITs. Additionally, if the latent assets hypothesis is correct, these differences should be
most pronounced during the ﬁrst hour of trading, when the bulk of the overnight
information is disseminated into the market.
McInish and Wood (1992) examine intraday bid/ask spread behavior of stocks on the
NYSE and AMEX between 1982 and 1992. They document a backwards J-shaped
pattern, where spreads are largest at the open, decline monotonically until approximately
1:30 and then increase monotonically until the close. Again, these results tend to conﬁrm
earlier work in the area of market microstructure that documents that large amounts of
overnight information is being brought to the market at the beginning of trading and also
suggest that specialist uncertainty is highest at the beginning of the trading day. Under
the latent assets hypothesis for REIT underperformance, REITs should exhibit
signiﬁcantly greater spreads at the open and throughout the trading day when compared
to non-REITs, because of greater specialist uncertainty resulting from fewer informed
traders. If less informed trading activity occurs in REITs, specialists have less information
with which to set accurate bid and ask prices, thereby acting to widen the spread.
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The initial REIT sample used in this study consists of a total of ninety-four REITs,
obtained from the National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts, which were
continuously listed on the NYSE during 1991. 1991 was chosen as the base year for this
study because it was the most recent year for which all the necessary data were available
to the authors. The non-REIT sample consists of all non-REIT securities that were
continuously listed on the NYSE during 1991. Listing information and market
capitalization data for both samples are obtained from the Center for Research on
Security Prices (CRSP) database. The percentage of institutional ownership for each
security in the non-REIT sample is obtained from Compact Disclosure, and institutional
holdings for the REIT sample are obtained from the S&P Stock Guide. Institutional
ownership information is not available for all publicly traded REITs, reducing the ﬁnal
sample of REITs to a total of thirty-seven securities.
The transactions data utilized in this study are obtained from the Institute for the
Study of Securities Markets (ISSM) database. The ISSM ﬁles provide a detailed, time-
stamped chronology of each trade and quote for all NYSE-listed ﬁrms. Each trade listed
on the ISSM ﬁles consists of a bid and ask price, number of shares traded, and time at
which the trade occurred time-stamped to the nearest second. For the purposes of this
study, all trades occurring on exchanges other than the NYSE are excluded, thereby
eliminating the possibility of comparing transactions across dissimilar exchanges.
This study follows the methodology of Wood, McInish and Ord (1985) in calculating
mean interval returns for all REIT and non-REIT securities in the sample, although
ﬁfteen-minute intervals are employed throughout the trading day rather than the one-
minute intervals used by Wood et al. In 1991, the NYSE opened for trading at 9:30 a.m.
and closed at 4:00 p.m., with late trades settling as late as 4:15 p.m., resulting in a total of
twenty-seven ﬁfteen-minute intervals for each of the roughly 250 trading days. The return,
number of trades, number of shares traded, and average bid/ask spread over each interval
for each security in the sample are recorded for each trading day during the year, resulting
in a combined sample of over 500,000 observations for each ﬁfteen-minute interval.
A series of OLS regressions are estimated using the full data set to test for systematic
differences in the intraday trading patterns of REITs versus non-REITs, using a dummy
variable approach. The OLS regressions provide the opportunity to test for differences
between REITs and non-REITs while simultaneously controlling for possible
confounding factors such as ﬁrm size, institutional ownership, stock price, and trading
activity. Four separate regressions are estimated using each of the twenty-seven ﬁfteen-
minute intervals, with the regressions being of the form:
TRADESjit5a1b1MKTCAPj1b2BIDPRICEjit1 bjREITTYPEj , (1)
VOLUMEjit5a1b1MKTCAPj1b2BIDPRICEjit1 bjREITTYPEj , (2)
SPREADjit5a1b1MKTCAPj1b2VOLUMEjit1b3BIDPRICEjit1
bjREITTYPEj ,  (3)
RETURNjit5a1b1MKTCAPj1b2VOLUMEjit1b3BIDPRICEjit1
bjREITTYPEj ,  (4)
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TRADESjit = the number of transactions occurring for stock j in interval i
on day t;
VOLUMEjit = the total volume in hundreds of shares traded, on stock j
during interval i on day t;
SPREADjit = the average bid/ask spread for stock j during interval i on day t;
RETURNjit = the return on stock j for interval i on day t;
MKTCAPj = the market capitalization of the ﬁrm deﬁned as the number of
shares outstanding multiplied by the closing price of the ﬁrm
on December 31, 1991;
BIDPRICEjit = the quoted bid price of stock j at the end of interval i on day t;
REITTYPEj = a set of zero-one dummy variables for each REIT type
(equity, mortgage and hybrid), which are equal to one if the
security is classiﬁed as that type of REIT and zero otherwise.
All observations where no trading occurs over the interval are eliminated from the
regressions on the dependent variables SPREAD and RETURN, thereby excluding the
possibility of introducing non-trading bias into the model. This restriction results in
sample sizes for the second two regression models which are roughly one-half the size of
those for TRADES and VOLUME.
The effects of institutional ownership on the intraday behavior of REITs are tested by
splitting the equity REIT sample into two subsamples by percentage of institutional
ownership, with one subsample consisting of all equity REITs with institutional
ownership above 30% (ﬁrst-half subsample) and the other subsample consisting of all
equity REITs with institutional ownership of 30% and below (second-half subsample).
Because there are only eight mortgage REITs and two hybrid REITs with the necessary
institutional ownership information, performing this type of analysis on them would be
impractical. Hence, there are a total of thirteen equity REITs in the ﬁrst-half subsample
and twelve equity REITs in the second-half subsample. Utilizing the two newly created
REIT subsamples, each of the original OLS models are reestimated utilizing the full non-
REIT sample. This methodology provides an opportunity to examine the intraday
trading behavior of equity REITs with respect to the level of institutional ownership,
thereby providing an opportunity to directly test the latent assets hypothesis for the
underperformance of REITs.
Results
Full Sample Regression Results
Prior to performing the regression analysis, the intraday trading patterns of both the
REIT and non-REIT samples were examined by plotting volume, number of trades,
bid/ask spread, and returns across the time intervals. While the magnitudes of the plots
were different for REITs and non-REITs, in all cases the classic U-shaped or J-shaped
patterns were observed for both samples. Exhibit 1 provides a detailed description of the
number of trades per ﬁfteen-minute interval, and Exhibit 2 provides a similar analysis of
the volume of shares traded per interval. Note that REIT trading patterns appear to be
similar to those found for publicly traded ﬁrms in general, in that the highest level of
MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE OF REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS 339trading activity occurs in the ﬁrst hour of trading. In both cases, trading activity slows
towards the middle of the day and then increases again near the close. However, in order
to accurately test whether the intraday trading patterns of REITs are different from those
of non-REITs, it is necessary to control for possible confounding factors such as ﬁrm
size, share price, trading activity, and institutional ownership.
Trading Activity The regression results for TRADES are presented in Exhibit 3 and
the parameter estimates of the REIT-type dummy variables are plotted across each time
interval in Exhibit 4. As expected, the values of the parameter estimates for HYBRDUM
and EQTYDUM are negative throughout the trading day. The p-values associated with
the estimates of EQTYDUM are less than .01 for each of the twenty-seven ﬁfteen-minute
intervals, while the p-values for the estimates of HYBRDUM are less than .10 in eighteen
of the twenty-seven intervals. These results indicate that equity and hybrid REITs trade
less frequently than similar non-REIT securities, even after controlling for differences in
size, price and percentage of institutional ownership. For example, the parameter
estimate obtained for EQTYDUM in the 9:45 a.m. interval is 21.301, which indicates
that on average, an equity REIT trades 1.301 fewer times in the ﬁrst ﬁfteen minutes of
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Exhibit 1
Frequency of Trades by Fifteen-Minute Interval for All REITs in the Full 1991
NYSE Sample
Number of Trades as a Percent of the
Mean Maximum Total Number of Observations per Interval
Time Trades per Trades per —————————————————————————————
Interval Interval Interval 0 1 2–5 6–10 $10
9:45 1.14 33 48.4% 28.1% 20.0% 2.9% .5%
10:00 1.17 100 61.8 14.4 18.8 3.7 1.0
10:15 .55 88 73.9 14.1 10.7 1.1 .0
10:30 .54 43 73.9 14.2 10.7 .9 .1
10:45 .52 45 73.9 14.4 10.6 1.1 .0
11:00 .51 25 73.9 14.7 10.4 .8 .0
11:15 .51 44 74.1 14.6 10.3 .9 .0
11.30 .52 27 73.5 14.8 10.7 .8 .0
11:45 .52 48 73.7 14.8 10.6 .9 .0
12:00 .50 39 74.0 14.6 10.5 .8 .0
12:15 .47 63 75.1 14.4 9.8 .7 .0
12:30 .43 19 77.2 13.2 8.8 .6 .0
12:45 .39 31 77.8 13.4 8.2 .5 .0
13:00 .39 70 77.9 13.6 8.0 .5 .0
13:15 .38 29 78.6 12.8 8.0 .5 .0
13:30 .36 17 78.8 13.2 7.5 .4 .0
13:45 .39 23 77.6 13.7 8.2 .4 .0
14:00 .43 28 76.5 14.2 8.6 .7 .0
14:15 .44 27 76.1 14.3 8.9 .6 .0
14:30 .47 29 75.1 14.3 9.8 .7 .0
14:45 .49 65 73.8 15.3 10.0 .6 .0
15:00 .50 36 73.4 15.4 10.4 .7 .0
15:15 .51 27 73.1 15.2 10.9 .7 .0
15:30 .54 51 72.4 15.4 11.2 .9 .0
15:45 .58 53 70.5 16.4 12.0 1.0 .0
16:00 .70 37 65.8 18.3 14.3 1.5 .0
16:15 .21 40 87.1 9.3 3.4 .2 .0trading than a similar non-REIT. In contrast, the corresponding parameter estimate for
HYBRDUM is 2.519, suggesting a hybrid REIT trades an average of .519 fewer times in
the ﬁrst ﬁfteen-minute interval, although this estimate is not signiﬁcantly different from
zero at the 10% level.
Surprisingly, the parameter estimates for MRTGDUM are positive throughout the
trading day, turning negative only in the last ﬁfteen-minute interval. The estimates differ
signiﬁcantly from zero at the 10% level for twenty-two of the twenty-seven intervals. In
contrast to the results for equity and hybrid REITs, the results indicate that a typical
mortgage REIT trades .641 more times than a similar non-REIT during the ﬁrst ﬁfteen
minutes of trading.
Volume The results of the regressions run on the dependent variable VOLUME are
presented in Exhibit 5 and the parameter estimates for the dummy variable EQTYDUM,
MRTGDUM and HYBRDUM are plotted across each time interval in Exhibit 6. The
dummy variable parameter estimates for each REIT type are negative throughout the
entire trading day. The parameter estimates for EQTYDUM are negative and highly
signiﬁcant across all twenty-seven intervals and the magnitude of the estimates is the
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Exhibit 2
Volume of Shares Traded by Fifteen-Minute Interval for All REITs in the Full
1991 NYSE Sample
Volume of Shares Traded as a Percent of the
Mean Maximum Total Number of Observations per Interval
Time Interval Interval ———————————————————————————
Interval Volume† Volume† 0 100–500 600–1000 1000–5000 $5000
9:45 12.99 3,633 48.4% 17.9% 9.2% 18.3% 6.2%
10:00 9.98 4,692 61.8 13.2 6.6 13.6 4.8
10:15 6.80 19,451 73.9 10.6 5.1 8.1 2.3
10:30 5.68 2,083 73.9 10.7 5.0 8.0 2.4
10:45 5.07 1,014 73.9 11.0 4.9 7.9 2.3
11:00 5.02 1,790 73.9 11.2 5.2 7.5 2.2
11:15 4.81 1,072 74.1 11.0 5.0 8.0 1.9
11.30 4.90 1,315 73.5 11.2 5.2 8.5 1.6
11:45 4.83 1,271 73.7 11.3 5.4 7.9 1.7
12:00 5.01 1,909 74.0 11.2 5.1 7.5 2.2
12:15 5.00 2,200 75.1 11.1 4.9 7.5 1.4
12:30 4.22 1,169 77.2 9.7 4.5 7.0 1.6
12:45 3.90 1,935 77.8 10.3 4.5 6.1 1.3
13:00 3.88 1,275 77.9 10.0 4.4 6.2 1.5
13:15 3.55 1,052 78.6 9.9 4.3 5.7 1.5
13:30 3.24 970 78.8 10.0 4.1 5.8 1.3
13:45 3.76 1,341 77.6 10.6 4.2 6.0 1.6
14:00 3.80 546 76.5 10.7 4.7 6.5 1.6
14:15 3.82 674 76.1 10.8 4.8 6.6 1.7
14:30 4.13 894 75.1 11.3 4.9 7.2 1.5
14:45 4.48 995 73.8 11.6 5.2 7.8 1.6
15:00 4.47 1,222 73.4 11.8 5.4 7.6 1.8
15:15 4.71 828 73.1 11.5 5.3 8.3 1.8
15:30 5.04 2,146 72.4 12.0 5.4 8.1 2.1
15:45 5.86 2,525 70.5 12.4 5.6 9.3 2.2
16:00 6.85 1,884 65.8 13.5 6.9 10.9 2.9

































































Regression Results by Fifteen-Minute Interval for the Dependent Variable TRADES Using the Full 1991 NYSE Sample
(n = 615,237)
TRADES* 9:45 AM 10:00 AM 10:15 AM 10:30 AM 10:45 AM 11:00 AM 11:15 AM 11:30 AM 11:45 AM
INTERCEPT .227*** 2.353*** 2.298*** 2.190** 2.145*** 2.117*** 2.095*** 2.058*** 2.043***
MKTCAP .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000***
BIDPRICE .059*** .105*** .064*** .051*** .047*** .045*** .041*** .039*** .037***
INSTHLDG 5.499*** 8.331*** 5.078*** 4.040*** 3.682*** 3.531*** 3.388*** 3.250*** 3.119***
EQTYDUM 21.301*** 22.135*** 21.539*** 21.230*** 21.127*** 21.075*** 21.002*** 2.967*** 2.875***
MRTGDUM .641*** .564*** .047 .152 .135 .093 .216* .233* .224**
HYBRDUM 2.519 2.624 2.547 2.475 2.448 2.486* 2.453* 2.367 2.395**
12:00 PM 12:15 PM 12:30 PM 12:45 PM 1:00 PM 1:15 PM 1:30 PM 1:45 PM 2:00 PM
INTERCEPT 2.046*** 2.053*** 2.026*** 2.051*** 2.053*** 2.048*** 2.059*** 2.050*** 2.049***
MKTCAP .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000***
BIDPRICE .036*** .034*** .030*** .029*** .028*** .027*** .027*** .027*** .028***
INSTHLDG 3.015*** 2.876*** 2.499*** 2.431*** 2.348*** 2.256*** 2.286*** 2.325*** 2.431***
EQTYDUM 2.849*** 2.807*** 2.676*** 2.659*** 2.619*** 2.582*** 2.604*** 2.612*** 2.644***
MRTGDUM .181* .217** .154* .175** .194** .184** .131* .173** .216***
HYBRDUM 2.350* 2.359** 2.296** 2.271* 2.220 2.289** 2.297** 2.302** 2.233
2:15 PM 2:30 PM 2:45 PM 3:00 PM 3:15 PM 3:30 PM 3:45 PM 4:00 PM 4:15 PM
INTERCEPT 2.049*** 2.051*** 2.078*** 2.091*** 2.148*** 2.133*** 2.124*** 2.005*** 2.145***
MKTCAP .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000***
BIDPRICE .030*** .031*** .034*** .036*** .041*** .042*** .045*** .049*** .025***
INSTHLDG 2.527*** 2.655*** 2.885*** 3.004*** 3.243*** 3.343*** 3.533*** 3.937*** 2.545***
EQTYDUM 2.676*** 2.684*** 2.734*** 2.780*** 2.859*** 2.877*** 2.944*** 21.112*** 2.725***
MRTGDUM .183*** .221*** .300*** .205*** .156* .188* .231** .213* 2.047
HYBRDUM 2.229 2.272* 2.330* 2.355** 2.346* 2.385** 2.368* 2.501** 2.253**
*signiﬁcant at the 10% level
**signiﬁcant at the 5% level


























































































































































Regression Results by Fifteen-Minute Interval for the Dependent Variable VOLUME Using the Full 1991 NYSE Sample
(n5615,237)
VOLUME* 9:45 AM 10:00 AM 10:15 AM 10:30 AM 10:45 AM 11:00 AM 11:15 AM 11:30 AM 11:45 AM
INTERCEPT 1.338*** 23.633*** 24.397*** 23.027*** 22.476*** 22.184*** 22.514*** 21.399*** 21.568***
MKTCAP .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000***
BIDPRICE .968*** .948*** .692*** .536*** .484*** .459*** .408*** .372*** .377***
INSTHLDG 171.663*** 159.780*** 123.996*** 105.735*** 94.805*** 91.015*** 88.368*** 83.305*** 77.150***
EQTYDUM 252.038*** 245.390*** 232.386*** 230.134*** 227.934*** 226.622***224.739*** 224.493*** 221.933***
MRTGDUM 29.675 28.684 28.873 26.366 25.796 26.075 24.886 23.812 24.362
HYBRDUM 225.579** 220.214 217.877 216.193 213.800 215.079* 214.080* 211.278 210.894
12:00 PM 12:15 PM 12:30 PM 12:45 PM 1:00 PM 1:15 PM 1:30 PM 1:45 PM 2:00 PM
INTERCEPT 21.312*** 22.016*** 21.165*** 21.429*** 21.321*** 21.023*** 21.374*** 21.380*** 21.120***
MKTCAP .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000***
BIDPRICE .335*** .328*** .291*** .292*** .262*** .261*** .264*** .267*** .281***
INSTHLDG 75.176*** 72.586*** 64.871*** 60.258*** 58.210*** 55.357*** 54.080*** 54.235*** 55.293***
EQTYDUM 221.150*** 218.910*** 217.624*** 215.831*** 215.557*** 215.249***214.887*** 214.893*** 215.555***
MRTGDUM 24.023 22.830 23.052 23.063 22.060 22.839 22.697 21.418 22.379
HYBRDUM 210.950* 29.320 28.848 29.058* 28.043 28.822 28.023 27.749 27.653
2:15 PM 2:30 PM 2:45 PM 3:00 PM 3:15 PM 3:30 PM 3:45 PM 4:00 PM 4:15 PM
INTERCEPT 21.390*** 21.388*** 21.452*** 21.817*** 22.516*** 22.232*** 21.926*** .461*** 23.713***
MKTCAP .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000***
BIDPRICE .291*** .293*** .324*** .335*** .400*** .407*** .429*** .441*** .582***
INSTHLDG 59.060*** 61.236*** 63.638*** 67.250*** 71.916*** 74.999*** 78.135*** 89.929*** 61.489***
EQTYDUM 216.635*** 216.794*** 217.387*** 218.323*** 219.654*** 220.460***220.809*** 225.852*** 220.299***
MRTGDUM 22.845 22.340 21.073 23.454 23.676 22.971 23.122 26.210 26.069
HYBRDUM 27.364 27.685 29.291* 29.396 210.031 210.982 211.103 213.598* 28.579
*signiﬁcant at the 10% level
**signiﬁcant at the 5% level


























































Parameter Estimates of MRTGDUM, EQTYDUM and HYBRDUM for the Dependent Variable VOLUME by Fifteen-
Minute Interval, 1991






























Volumelargest in the ﬁrst hour of trading. The wide differences observed between equity REITs
and non-REITs in the ﬁrst hour of trading is noteworthy, since it is generally believed
that the largest amount of information ﬂows into the market at the opening. These results
indicate that lower levels of information trading occur in equity REITs than in similar
non-REITs, and are therefore consistent with the latent assets hypothesis for REIT
underperformance.
The parameter estimates for MRTGDUM are insigniﬁcant everywhere, while the
estimates for HYBRDUM are insigniﬁcant for twenty of the twenty-seven intervals. The
result for MRTGDUM suggests that even though mortgage REITs trade more frequently
than similar non-REITs, the elevated trading activity does not translate into signiﬁcantly
higher volume. Hence, this implies trading in mortgage REITs is dominated by small, or
atomistic investors, who trade in small share amounts.
Bid/Ask Spreads The results for SPREAD are presented in Exhibit 7. The parameter
estimates for EQTYDUM are positive and signiﬁcant at the .01 level across each interval,
indicating that equity REITs trade at spreads wider than those of similar non-REITs. In
contrast, the parameter estimates for MRTGDUM are negative throughout the entire
day, and the estimates are signiﬁcant at the .10 level in twenty-two of the twenty-seven
intervals, indicating mortgage REITs trade at spreads that are smaller than those of
similar non-REITs. The results of the dummy variable HYBRDUM are not different
from zero anywhere, which seems appropriate since hybrid REITs are a composite of the
mortgage and equity REIT types.
The parameter estimates for EQTYDUM and MRTGDUM are presented graphically
in Exhibit 8. Interestingly, equity REIT spreads are signiﬁcantly wider than those for
similar non-REITs in the ﬁrst ﬁfteen-minute interval, and continue to widen throughout
the day. For example, equity REIT spreads are 2.32 cents wider, on average, than those of
comparable non-REITs in the ﬁrst ﬁfteen minutes of trading, with this difference
increasing to over four cents per share later in the day. In contrast, the spreads for
mortgage REITs average roughly one cent narrower than spreads for similar non-REITs,
and this differential appears to remain generally constant throughout the trading day.
The results of the analysis of VOLUME, TRADES and SPREAD indicate differential
treatment of mortgage and equity REITs on the part of NYSE specialists. Specialists
begin the trading day by pricing equity REITs at spreads wider than those of similar non-
REITs, and subsequently push these spreads wider, on a relative basis, as the trading day
progresses. It has been well documented in the market microstructure literature that
intraday bid/ask spreads exhibit a backward J-shaped pattern, and it is generally
accepted that spreads are widest early in the day due to the high degree of uncertainty on
the part of the specialist (McInish and Wood, 1992). As informed traders enter the
market, specialists are able to monitor their trading activity, thereby reducing the level of
uncertainty on the part of the specialist and leading to narrower spreads later in the day.
The latent assets hypothesis suggests that there are fewer informed traders in REITs,
which should translate into a larger degree of uncertainty on the part of specialists
making a market in REITs, thereby placing upward pressure on the size of the bid/ask
spreads. The results for the equity REITs in the sample are clearly consistent with this
expectation.
In contrast, the mortgage REITs in the sample exhibit spreads that would suggest lower
levels of uncertainty on the part of the specialist. Since the assets held in mortgage REITs
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Regression Results by Fifteen-Minute Interval for the Dependent Variable SPREAD Using the Full 1991 NYSE Sample
(n = 289,358)
SPREAD* 9:45 AM 10:00 AM 10:15 AM 10:30 AM 10:45 AM 11:00 AM 11:15 AM 11:30 AM 11:45 AM
INTERCEPT .188*** .179*** .173*** .169*** .168*** .167*** .167*** .166*** .165***
MKTCAP .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000***
VOLUME .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000***
BIDPRICE .003*** .003*** .002*** .002*** .002*** .002*** .002*** .002*** .002***
INSTHLDG 2.005*** 2.008*** 2.015*** 2.019*** 2.019*** 2.017*** 2.018*** 2.015*** 2.0.22***
EQTYDUM .023*** .029*** .030*** .033*** .037*** .033*** .033*** .032*** .037***
MRTGDUM 2.12*** 2.011*** 2.009** 2.012*** 2.012*** 2.012*** 2.014*** 2.009*** 2.007
HYBRDUM 2.010 2.001 .001 2.001 2.004 2.004 2.001 .000 2.001
12:00 PM 12:15 PM 12:30 PM 12:45 PM 1:00 PM 1:15 PM 1:30 PM 1:45 PM 2:00 PM
INTERCEPT .164*** .163*** .162*** .160*** .159*** .160*** .158*** .161*** .160***
MKTCAP .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000***
VOLUME .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000***
BIDPRICE .002*** .002*** .002*** .002*** .002*** .002*** .002*** .002*** .002***
INSTHLDG 2.022*** 2.020*** 2.020*** 2.022*** 2.018*** 2.020*** 2.019*** 2.016*** 2.021***
EQTYDUM .036*** .037*** .035*** .039*** .042*** .040*** .038*** .037*** .039***
MRTGDUM 2.008* 2.010** 2.009** 2.011** 2.006 2.007 2.008* 2.007* 2.006
HYBRDUM 2.011 2.002 .001 .012 .020* .005 .015 2.002 .011
2:15 PM 2:30 PM 2:45 PM 3:00 PM 3:15 PM 3:30 PM 3:45 PM 4:00 PM 4:15 PM
INTERCEPT .160*** .160*** .160*** .160*** .162*** .160*** .163*** .166*** .166***
MKTCAP .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000***
VOLUME .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000***
BIDPRICE .002*** .002*** .002*** .002*** .002*** .003*** .003*** .003*** .002***
INSTHLDG 2.022*** 2.021*** 2.022*** 2.018*** 2.017*** 2.024*** 2.022*** 2.025*** 2.010***
EQTYDUM .038*** .038*** .037*** .036*** .034*** .031*** .033*** .031*** .036***
MRTGDUM 2.008* 2.012*** 2.010** 2.007* 2.013*** 2.008* 2.009** 2.008** 2.003
HYBRDUM .001 .003 .011 .006 .002 2.005 .001 .009 .017
*signiﬁcant at the 10% level
**signiﬁcant at the 5% level
































































































Timeare generally considered easier to price, and therefore less risky, this is not particularly
surprising.
Regression Results for Institutional Ownership Subsamples of Equity REITs
In order to directly investigate the role of informed traders and their effect on the
intraday trading patterns of REITs, the full equity REIT sample is divided into two
subsamples by percentage of institutional ownership (above 30%, 30% and less) and then
the previously employed regression estimation procedures are repeated. Mortgage and
hybrid REITs are omitted from this part of the analysis because their small sample sizes
make splitting them by institutional ownership impractical.
If equity REITs perform differently from other types of equity securities, due to a lack
of informed traders, it would be expected that the trading patterns of equity REITs with
the highest percentage of institutional ownership be most closely aligned with those of
similar non-REITs. This result would be consistent with WEGC, who ﬁnd that REITs
that are widely held by institutions perform better than REITs that are not widely held.
Conversely, equity REITs with the lowest percentage of institutional ownership should
exhibit relatively low levels of information trading, thereby implying larger differences in
the number of trades, volume and bid/ask spread when compared with similar non-
REITs.
Trading Activity and Volume by Institutional Ownership The results of the subsample
regression for TRADES and VOLUME are presented in Exhibit 9 and Exhibit 10,
respectively. Surprisingly, equity REITs in the ﬁrst-half subsample (over 30% institutional
ownership) trade less often and in lower average volume than the REITs in the second-
half subsample (under 30% and lower institutional ownership). For example, in the ﬁrst
ﬁfteen minutes of trading, REITs in the ﬁrst-half subsample typically trade 2.88 fewer
times with corresponding volume of 9,869 fewer shares than similar non-REITs. During
the same interval, second-half subsample REITs trade only .89 fewer times with a trading
volume of 3,485 fewer shares than similar non-REITs.
Exhibits 11 and 12 plot the parameter estimates for EQTYDUM with ﬁrst-half and
second-half subsample regressions on TRADES and VOLUME, respectively. It is
interesting to note that while the patterns of the plots are quite similar in shape, the
magnitudes of the parameter estimates for the ﬁrst half are several times larger than those
of the second half throughout the entire trading day. This result contradicts the latent
assets hypothesis. If informed traders are driving the underperformance of REITs, then
institutional ownership should act to diminish, rather than amplify the trading pattern
divergence observed. These results indicate that institutional investors trade equity
REITs much less frequently than they trade similar non-REIT securities, preferring
instead to utilize a buy-and-hold strategy unlike that used with similar non-REITs.
Alternatively, a larger percentage of ownership by individual investors results in
intensiﬁed trading activity in REITs, suggesting that individual investors trade REITs in
a manner similar to other non-REIT equity securities.
Bid/Ask Spreads and Institutional Ownership Since REITs with the highest level of
institutional ownership exhibit the largest divergence in both the number of trades and
volume of shares traded from similar non-REITs, it follows that such REITs should also
exhibit the largest divergence from non-REITs in terms of bid/ask spread. The results of
































































Results for Regressions Run on the First and Second Halves of the Sample by Institutional Holding, for the
Dependent Variable TRADES
(n5589,413)
First-Half Subsample (Institutional Ownership >30%) Results by Institutional Ownership
TRADES* 9:45 AM 10:00 AM 10:15 AM 10:30 AM 10:45 AM 11:00 AM 11:15 AM 11:30 AM 11:45 AM
INTERCEPT 1.832 2.701 2.296 2.130 2.073 2.093 2.021 2.072 2.058
MKTCAP .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
BIDPRICE .057 .101 .060 .048 .044 .041 .039 .036 .034
INSTHLDG 4.406 6.632 4.177 3.362 2.958 2.816 2.721 2.544 2.409
EQTYDUM 22.883 25.243 24.327 23.647 23.419 23.301 23.140 23.086 22.933
12:00 PM 12:15 PM 12:30 PM 12:45 PM 1:00 PM 1:15 PM 1:30 PM 1:45 PM 2:00 PM
INTERCEPT 2.030 2.024 1.971 1.933 1.900 1.923 1.860 1.888 1.881
MKTCAP .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
BIDPRICE .032 .030 .025 .026 .025 .024 .024 .024 .025
INSTHLDG 2.383 2.208 1.972 1.919 1.881 1.805 1.845 1.826 1.945
EQTYDUM 22.895 22.828 22.619 22.628 22.571 22.540 22.526 22.514 22.563
2:15 PM 2:30 PM 2:45 PM 3:00 PM 3:15 PM 3:30 PM 3:45 PM 4:00 PM 4:15 PM
INTERCEPT 1.913 1.918 1.923 1.901 1.842 1.846 1.844 1.939 1.756
MKTCAP .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
BIDPRICE .027 .028 .031 .033 .039 .039 .043 .046 .015
INSTHLDG 1.956 2.051 2.255 2.328 2.612 2.670 2.769 3.021 1.750















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Results for Regressions Run on the First and Second Halves of the Sample by Institutional Holding, for the
Dependent Variable VOLUME
(n5589,413)
First-Half Subsample (Institutional Ownership >30%) Results by Institutional Ownership
VOLUME* 9:45 AM 10:00 AM 10:15 AM 10:30 AM 10:45 AM 11:00 AM 11:15 AM 11:30 AM 11:45 AM
INTERCEPT 36.711 44.200 45.935 42.492 39.912 39.071 35.179 36.915 34.144
MKTCAP .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
BIDPRICE .838 .707 .384 .223 .215 .170 .149 .105 .147
INSTHLDG 158.053 145.184 122.834 110.667 98.080 95.595 96.294 89.149 83.297
EQTYDUM 298.685 299.312 286.579 282.291 277.152 274.943 270.425 270.061 264.461
12:00 PM 12:15 PM 12:30 PM 12:45 PM 1:00 PM 1:15 PM 1:30 PM 1:45 PM 2:00 PM
INTERCEPT 33.910 32.034 32.824 32.200 32.281 32.976 30.262 29.902 30.370
MKTCAP .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
BIDPRICE .086 .077 .025 .048 .028 .019 .035 .048 .069
INSTHLDG 83.269 81.587 76.026 69.704 68.183 64.710 63.527 62.194 62.464
EQTYDUM 263.047 259.225 257.667 254.460 255.159 254.140 252.106 251.063 251.940
2:15 PM 2:30 PM 2:45 PM 3:00 PM 3:15 PM 3:30 PM 3:45 PM 4:00 PM 4:15 PM
INTERCEPT 30.125 29.854 30.779 30.038 30.013 30.222 30.443 33.683 40.715
MKTCAP .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
BIDPRICE .068 .080 .108 .124 .188 .187 .227 .249 .302
INSTHLDG 66.006 68.141 67.598 71.413 75.521 77.927 78.415 86.084 42.425















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































EQTYDUM Parameter Estimates for Regressions Run on the First- and Second-Half Subsamples by Institutional
















































































EQTYDUM Parameter Estimates for Regressions Run on the First- and Second-Half Subsamples by Institutional






















































































Results for Regressions Run on the First Half of the Sample by Institutional Holding, for the 
Dependent Variable SPREAD
(n5314,561)
SPREAD* 9:45 AM 10:00 AM 10:15 AM 10:30 AM 10:45 AM 11:00 AM 11:15 AM 11:30 AM 11:45 AM
INTERCEPT .189 .180 .174 .170 .169 .168 .168 .167 .166
MKTCAP .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
VOLUME .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
BIDPRICE .003 .003 .002 .002 .002 .002 .002 .002 .002
INSTHLDG 2.010 2.013 2.017 2..021 2.021 2.020 2.020 2.018 2.025
EQTYDUM .018 .025 .023 .025 .030 .025 .028 .025 .029
12:00 PM 12:15 PM 12:30 PM 12:45 PM 1:00 PM 1:15 PM 1:30 PM 1:45 PM 2:00 PM
INTERCEPT .165 .165 .163 .162 .161 .162 .160 .163 .161
MKTCAP .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
VOLUME .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
BIDPRICE .002 .002 .002 .002 .002 .002 .002 .002 .002
INSTHLDG 2.024 2.022 2.023 2.025 2.022 2.023 2.023 2.020 2.024
EQTYDUM .027 .029 .025 .027 .034 .030 .028 .030 .031
2:15 PM 2:30 PM 2:45 PM 3:00 PM 3:15 PM 3:30 PM 3:45 PM 4:00 PM 4:15 PM
INTERCEPT .161 .162 .162 .162 .163 .161 .164 .167 .167
MKTCAP .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
VOLUME .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
BIDPRICE .002 .002 .002 .002 .002 .003 .003 .003 .002
INSTHLDG 2.026 2.024 2.026 2.022 2.021 2.026 2.024 2.027 2.011
EQTYDUM .029 .028 .031 .030 .024 .025 .028 .026 .028
*All parameter estimates are signiﬁcant at the .01 level.MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE OF REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS 357

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































EQTYDUM Parameter Estimates for Regressions Run on the First- and Second-Half Subsamples by Institutional






















Second Halfthe regressions on SPREAD are presented in Exhibits 13 and 14, and the values of the
parameter estimates for EQTYDUM for each subsample are plotted across each time
interval in Exhibit 15. The spreads for each equity REIT subsample open signiﬁcantly
wider than for similar non-REITs and gradually increase as the trading day progresses.
The bid/ask spread differential for REITs with large institutional holdings is generally 2.5
to 3.0 cents wider, on average, than spreads of similar non-REITs. In contrast, the spread
differential for REITs with lower levels of institutional ownership opens at approximately
2.81 cents, reaches a maximum of 5.53 cents later in the day, and remains larger in
magnitude than the associated parameter estimates for REITs in the ﬁrst-half subsample.
Therefore, despite the predicted upward pressure placed on spreads from the previously
documented lower levels of trading activity for widely held REITs, the spreads for such
REITs are lower, on average, across the entire trading day. This implies that the amount
of information being transmitted by institutional investors is more than sufﬁcient to
offset any increased uncertainty on the part of the specialist resulting from non-trading.
In other words, specialists in REITs tend to discount information transmitted to the
market by non-institutional traders. The type of investor transacting the trade, rather
than the level of trading activity, appears to be the most important factor in the reduction
in the level of uncertainty on the part of the specialist.
The results of this study are intriguing because they show that overall, REITs trade
at spreads that are signiﬁcantly wider than those of similar non-REIT equities. This
suggests the existence of an inherent bid/ask spread penalty for investors who purchase
REITs, which the ﬁndings suggest is as large as 5.53 cents per share for REITs in the
second-half subsample. Documentation of this spread penalty is important because it
suggests that, all else being equal, the return for an investor on a round-trip transaction
in a REIT will be lower than that for an investment in a similar non-REIT, because of the
wider spreads.
Perhaps more importantly, a strong negative relationship is documented between the
bid/ask spread and institutional ownership for equity REITs, which is consistent with the
latent assets hypothesis for REIT underperformance. The results suggest that specialists
are less concerned with the level of trading in REITs than they are with the percentage of
informed traders in the population, and indicate that institutional traders are able to
reduce the level of uncertainty regarding the value of the underlying REIT assets. This is
found despite an apparent buy-and-hold trading strategy that would be expected to place
upward pressure on the bid/ask spread due to higher levels of non-trading. In contrast,
REITs with lower institutional ownership levels exhibit wider spreads than those with
high levels of institutional ownership, despite greater frequency of trading.
Conclusions
In this study, the latent assets hypothesis for REIT underperformance is investigated
utilizing a transaction-by-transaction database. The transactions data provides an
opportunity to examine the activity of informed traders in REITs on an intraday basis,
yielding insight into the previously unexplored intraday trading patterns of REITs. 
The results from the full REIT sample indicate that the market microstructure of
REITs is different than that of similar non-REITs. Strong evidence that the number of
trades and the volume of shares traded is signiﬁcantly lower for equity REITs than for
non-REITs is found after controlling for differences in size, share price and institutional
MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE OF REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS 359ownership. In addition, this differential is the most pronounced in the ﬁrst hour of
trading, when the largest amount of information is thought to ﬂow into the market. This
indicates the existence of an information trading deﬁcit for equity REITs, compared to
similar non-REITs, which is consistent with the latent assets hypothesis for REIT under-
performance. In contrast, mortgage REITs trade more frequently that similar non-
REITs, although the increased frequency of trades does not appear to translate into
signiﬁcantly higher volume. The results for hybrid REITs are inconclusive.
The analysis of relative spreads using the full sample indicates that equity REITs trade
at spreads that are signiﬁcantly wider than those of similar non-REITs, suggesting a
higher degree of uncertainty on the part of equity REIT specialists. However, mortgage
REITs trade at spreads that are signiﬁcantly smaller than those of similar non-REITs,
implying a lower degree of uncertainty surrounding the value of the underlying assets.
Once again, hybrid REIT results are inconclusive.
The differences observed between equity and mortgage REITs from the full sample
regressions are striking. Clearly, equity REITs trade less frequently, at lower volume, and
at wider spreads than similar non-REIT securities. This result is consistent with the latent
assets hypothesis. Alternatively, mortgage REITs appear to demonstrate trading patterns
that are comparable to similar non-REIT securities, except for spreads, which are
generally smaller. One explanation for this ﬁnding is that the level of uncertainty
surrounding the asset values of mortgage REITs is lower than the level of uncertainty
surrounding the asset values of equity REITs. Therefore, even if mortgage REITs are
traded by fewer informed investors, there is little impact on the market’s assessment of
the value of the underlying assets.
Perhaps the most surprising result of this study is that equity REITs with the highest
percentage of institutional ownership exhibit the largest divergence from non-REITs in
terms of trading volume and trading frequency, yet trade at smaller spread differentials.
This result is important because it conﬁrms that specialists place greater emphasis on
signals transmitted by informed investors, while simultaneously discounting those trans-
mitted by uninformed investors, which is clearly consistent with the latent assets
hypothesis. In addition, the institutional ownership results are consistent with WEGC,
who ﬁnd that the REITs that perform best are those with the largest percentage of
institutional ownership.
The overall results of this study support the latent assets hypothesis for the under-
performance of REITs. In particular, the empirical results indicate that the level of
uncertainty surrounding value of equity REITs is reduced when the percentage of
institutional ownership increases. In addition, the results indicate that equity REITs
trade at spreads wider than those of similar non-REITs.
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